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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN A
HYPERTROPHIC SOCIETY
LYNTON K. CALDWELLt
The tendencies of contemporary American society to inordinate
and uncontrolled growth are fundamentally incompatible with the
objectives of the environmental quality movement, as expressed in
the National Environmental Policy Act.' Certain short-term, partial,
or incremental improvements in environmental conditions may be
compatible with unrestricted growth. But the sheer magnitude of the
problems created by ever-increasing numbers of people, goods, and
services, and the mobile interactions among them, will frustrate all
efforts to create or maintain quality environments.
Paradoxically, the science and technology that have made possible
the run-away growth of contemporary industrial society have also
made possible the environmental quality movement. Men today
know, should know, or may know, the consequences of their environmental impacts. Science enables them to learn what is happening; and technology, in many instances, could correct or alleviate the
ill-effects of environmental abuse. But technology seldom is
adequately applied to protect or enhance the environment. Equally
in free-enterprising or socialist societies, technology is applied only
when, in some sense, it pays someone to apply it. The payoff is
usually economic; other possible payoffs-in health, safety, esthetics,
ecological stability, and the continuing renewability of resourcesbeing unperceived or discounted by most people and their political
leaders. And there are also serious problems of man's environmental
impacts for which technology has no apparent answers. Unending
expansion of human populations and technologies entails an
inexorable overstressing of the biosphere which no perspective technology can overcome.
The obvious explanation of this paradox is that science and technology have been applied toward the realization of goals and ambitions that have not been subjected to scientific scrutiny. Science has
been commandeered to serve purposes that scientific analysis might
reveal to be dangerous, improvident, or self-defeating. These negative
aspects of applied science (of "pesticides" for example) characteristically affect men in the aggregate, often gradually, and only
acutely at some future, and usually imprecise, point in time. MeantProfessor of Political Science, Indiana University; Chairman, Commission on Environmental Policy, Law, and Administration of the International Union for Conservation of
Nature and Natural Resources.
1. 42 U.S.C. § § 4321-47 (Supp. V, 1970).
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while, the government, the political party, the corporation, the local
community, or the individual may "benefit" from action that
poisons, degrades, or impoverishes the environment. Individuals do
not readily see the harmful consequences of science applied to
human purposes in agriculture, manufacturing, medicine, and transportation.
To object to the effects of hypertrophic affluence is widely condemned as self-centered ill-taste. Those who would contain growth
are reminded that there are fifty million poor people in America
who need more, not less, of everything. Many political "liberals" and
free-enterprising businessmen find themselves agreeing that selfish
environmentalists want to create an ecologically ordered world at the
expense of the poor. Efforts to preserve open space and endangered
wildlife, to conserve scenic beauty, and to prevent pollution are
attacked from both "right" and "left" by critics for whom unqualified procreation and material consumption comprise all that is
important in life.
In the technological society, the demands of ordinary people upon
their environments exceed those of pre-industrial monarchs. The
self-indulgent, materialistic, mass consuming society of democratic
America proclaims every man a "king" and every woman a "queen."
But the monarchial prototype is neither sober, hard-working Frederich William of Prussia, nor urbane, philosophic Marcus Aurelius-it
is the "I'll take mine now and to hell with the consequences"
Bourbon Louis XV, who, however, had the prescience to declare
"Apres moi le deulge. "2
The not so obvious explanation of the failure of society to be
guided by the knowledge that science makes possible is that men in
the mass are incapable of directing their own destinies. The overgrowth of modem society may, from this viewpoint, be treated as
pathological. The hypertrophic society has fallen victim to a social
"disease," an "endocrine failure" followed by run-away metabolism
and accelerating growth.' The negative feedback and homeostatic
mechanisms that contain and protect a stable self-renewing society
have been supplanted by the self-generating impetus of positive feedback. The hypertrophic society embarks upon an ever-accelerating
cycle of self-stimulation; development feeds development, growth
2. The consequences of the fusion of hedonism, individualism, and equalitarianism in the
dominant ethos of contemporary America have been analyzed at length by A. Hacker, The End
of the American Era (1970).
3. Leo Marx in an article generally paralleling the analysis presented in this paper, cites
several writers and scientists who have developed the concept of malignancy as the characterizing aspect of America's reckless, uncontrolled growth: Marx, American Institutions and

EcologicalIdeals, Science 945-52 (1970).
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grows upon growth. The pace of events moves faster and faster-the
rate of expansion and change outrunning the capacities of increasing
numbers of people to adjust. Disequilibriums, discontinuities, incompatibilities, and conflicts mount. Tension becomes pervasive.
Minor disasters and intimations of impending catastrophies disturb
the more perceptive observers but have no significant effect upon the
headlong rush of "progress."
Technological development increasingly ties the economy into a
"total system." Interdependicies increase. The autonomy of the individual is simultaneously increased and decreased, but the fate of the
individual is increasingly bound-up with the fate of mass society. The
farmer and frontiersman of America's past could make their own
accommodation with nature; the multi-millions of contemporary
America cannot. If their man-managed systems fail, many, perhaps
most, of them will shortly meet Malthusian fates. Although these
systems are visibly becoming more vulnerable, few people perceive
them as less reliable than the systems maintained by nature. The city
water main seems more reliable than the river which man has rendered unfit for many uses.
Unfortunately for the reliability of man-managed systems, societal
hypertrophy is accompanied by social tensions and antagonisms. As
with John B. Calhoun's rats, social war seems endemic in the
situation.4 As hypertrophy approaches advanced stages, the selfdestructive tendencies inherent in the disease become evermore
apparent. There may be a point beyond which the disease is fatal.
Whether this point, if it exists, has been passed in contemporary
societies cannot be determined by any analysis now available. There
are observers, however, who believe that this point has been passed
by more than a quarter-century and that nothing can avert the
collapse of existing social structures over large areas of the earth.
Whether this "collapse" is gradual and sporadic, or whether it may
come as a sudden crash, cannot be foreseen. The internal weakening
of the social structure that supports the system may be occurring
progressively while a society achieves such hypertrophic triumphs as
the SST, the John Hancock Building, and a trillion dollar GNP. Then,
suddenly the "structure" begins to falter, the society is unable to
mobilize its resources for a remedial response, failure of critical
aspects of the life-support system follows rapidly, and the social
system collapses into a state of chaos.
Socio-ecological bankruptcy, if and where it occurs, does not
necessarily imply the total dissolution of society nor the end of
civilization. But a reconstituting of the society would necessarily
4. PopulationDensity and Social Pathology, Scientific American, Feb. 1962, at 139-48.
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follow; no aggregation of people can live for long in anarchy. The
artificial systems that modern technology makes possible must continue somehow to be operated if the lives of large numbers of
dependent people are not to be forfeited. Under the more probable
conditions following socio-ecological collapse, this restoration would
be highly authoritarian and be backed by the summary use of force
with the involuntary acquiescence of the threatened and frightened
survivors.
This gloomy scenario is not a prognosis for all societies in the
modem world. Rend Dubos may be right in foreseeing the gradual
adaptation of men to progressively worsening ecological conditions.
Those societies in which populations have not outrun adequate
supplies of uncontaminated food and water, and in which concentrations of populations are not so large as to be totally dependent
upon the uninterrupted functioning of mechanized supply systems,
might effect a gradual correction of course that with watchfulness
and enforced restraint might lead in time to self-sustaining stability.
Hypertrophic societies, however, suffer from a malignancy rather
than from the chronic degenerative diseases of ecological deterioration pervasive in less-developed countries. The ever growing complexity and vulnerability of megalopolitan conurbations such as a
greater Tokyo, London, or New York increases the possibilities of
sudden, disastrous breaks in their life-support systems. The effects of
sustained deprivation of water, food, electricity, or police protection
from the hypertrophied megalopoli of the late 20th Century has yet
to be observed. Experiences in cities under attack in World War II are
not in most cases relevant.
For a variety of reasons, a concomitant (and contributory cause)
of socio-ecological collapse is social war. In European cities under
siege during World War II, notably London and Leningrad, external
threat united the beleaguered inhabitants to self-sacrifice, cooperation, and support of the civil and military authorities. Sabotage could
receive summary treatment; but a city under siege from within,
unremittingly harrassed and disrupted by guerrilla tactics, and
pervaded by massive disaffection, disloyalty and distrust, presents an
utterly different case. Life in London under air attack was grim but
hopeful, touched with a feeling of heroic struggle. Life in a megalopolis, corrupted by seemingly hopeless ecological decay and laid
open to unpreventable sabotage by unidentifiable individuals could
rapidly become insupportable. The antagonisms within the undigested ethnic mix of great American cities makes them especially
vulnerable to this type of disruption. The attitudes, assumptions, and
behavior patterns of modern Americans greatly complicate their
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coping with circumstances of this character. Remedies in any direction would require changes in American society that appear to be
beyond the bounds of probability. The slim prospect of spontaneous
remission should not be ruled out, but there is greater probability
that societal hypertrophy will run its destructive course, and that the
historical continuity of American society will be broken before the
end of the century.
Objectors to this prognosis of "decline and fall" may argue that, if
one must indulge his fancies in so gloomy and "un-American" a
direction, he ought also to consider whatever preventive measures
there may be to avoid or mitigate disaster. And "what boots it with
incessant care" to try to save the environment of a society inexorably headed for destruction? One's response may depend upon
his acceptance of a moral imperative. That imperative is based upon
two propositions: First, there is neither justice nor wisdom in
presumptuousness, in professing certainty where one cannot be sure;
second, the essence of human dignity, for the individual and for
society alike, is to live so that if disaster comes, its advent will have
been undeserved. We may paraphrase the words of the Spanish philosopher Unamuno who, paraphrasing Etienne de Senancour, wrote:
"And if it is nothingness that awaits us, let us so act that it shall be
an unjust fate."'
To these propositions a third may be added: He who wills the end
must will the means. One does not truly will the attainment of a
healthful, self-renewing, self-correcting society unless he wills the
means to its attainment. Those who, genuinely desire an ecologically
sound society, but act as though "wishing would make it so," are
guided by no moral imperative. They invite the contempt of anticonservationists who rightly discount the effectiveness of individuals
who are merely indulging their esthetic sensibilities. Those who
would effect a cure for malignant societal hypertrophy, and its concomitant environmental effects, must look at his task with a goalcentered objectivity comparable to a physician attempting to arrest
disease. Cure may be inconvenient, expensive, and painful. Where
many individuals are involved; and where capabilities fall short of
needs, choices may be required that, from some perspectives, may be
unjust. Few people, and almost none in public life, will admit in
theory what they acknowledge in practice-that choices in life are
rarely between the just and unjust, but are almost always among
varying degrees and conditions of injustice.
To acquiesce in the present dominant trend of society will effect
the great injustice of condemning the entire society to environmental
5. Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Peoples 263 (1926).
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degradation and ultimate societal collapse. But effective countermeasures entail their own lesser injustices, and these should be
honestly faced and alleviated so far as consistent with the larger
purpose. But the effort to create an ecologically viable society should
not be constrained by demands that it adhere to standards of justice
and equity that present societies have never observed. This is not to
say that the ends justify all means, it is merely, frankly, to recognize
that all of the choices available to us are in various ways painful. One
may suffer pain from an automobile accident and from surgery, but
the latter may be understood as controlled or purposeful pain, a
regrettably but unavoidable consequence of an effort to save life.
Environmental administration that is effective in today's world entails this kind of pain, but democratic society, unlike the voluntary
patient, has not committed itself into the hands of doctors who
would cure it. Nor, in the opinion of some otherwise hopeful observers, is it likely to do so until "stampeded" by hysterical reaction
to ecological catastrophe. By then, the time for cure may have
passed, but from among those who personally survive disaster may
come forth the architects of a new social order.
What manner of men would be required for this task? Their counterparts, uncommon anywhere, are especially inconspicuous in contemporary society. They will be men of a renaissance perhaps more
profound than that initiating the beginning of modern times. Collectively, they will need to embody the qualities of mind and outlook represented by Machiavelli, St. Francis, and da Vinci. Otherdirected exemplars of the Great Society will not do for tasks that
must actively involve real people but cannot be guided by anticipations of public opinion. Extrapolation of present styles of political
leadership into the future can only lead to the conclusion that it is
futile to expect effective leadership toward a reconstruction of social
values, priorities, and institutions. The type of politics that has,
heretofore, prevailed has not prevented and, at least in part, is accountable for the environmental crisis that is impending. Political
leadership of the conventional sort cannot realistically be expected
to guide the way toward remedial measures.
To meet and surmount what he calls the world crisis of transformation, John R. Platt calls for the large-scale mobilization of the
intellectual resources of the Nation. 6 He suggests task forces made
up of scientists and other citizens from all sectors of society. He
offers a method for determining priorities for investigation, using a
classification of problems and crises by estimated time and intensity.
But he provides no program for putting this effort into effect.
6. Platt, What We Must Do, Science 1115-21 (1969).
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Declaring that the only possible conclusion to an assessment of the
difficulties of modem society "is a call to action," he asks:
Who will commit himself to this kind of search for more ingenious
and fundamental solutions? Who will begin to assemble the research
teams and the funds? Who will begin to create those full-time interdisciplinary centers that will be necessary for testing detailed designs
and turning them into effective applications?'7
Answers to these questions do not come forth because Platt's crisis
of transformation, of massive, accelerating change, is accompanied
and partially caused by a crisis of mind and spirit, of will and
rationality.' To speculate beyond how the technical or behavioral
problems of man-environment relations might be attacked, brings
one to a level of discourse upon which few scholars are willing to
enter. This is the level of social theory, hitherto largely the domain
of philosophers and reformers. Modern social science has penetrated
the area at a few peripheral points, but the data and methodology of
social science in its present state have not been adequate to answer
the big questions concerning the behavior of societies. For this
reason no one can be sure of the course and consequences of the
environmental quality movement. Conjectures concerning possibilities point toward conclusions that appear to be either utopian or
threatening to important sectors of present society. To illustrate the
point, three possible courses for environmental policy will be indicated, each in its own way ungratifying.
The first possibility, predicted by critics of "environmentalism," is
that the public will not accept the constraints and self-denials necessary to cope with environmental degradation. This outcome is widely
prophesied by spokesmen for business enterprise, for technological
innovation, and for the poor. This "realistic" assessment is resigned
to the inevitable attrition of natural environments. Human adaptability and technological innovation are counted upon to overcome
effects in the environment that are harmful to society, and there is
often doubt expressed that conditions are really as bad as ecologists
would have us believe. Spokesmen for this viewpoint remind us that
man has survived great ecological catastrophes caused by nature,
citing volcanos, earthquakes, and floods; and they ask rhetorically
how society has been hurt by the extinction of the passenger pigeon
and the dodo bird. This projected course assumes little change in
present attidues or practices: reasonable control of pollution, yes!
7. Id. at 1121.
8. Caldwell, A Crisis of Will and Rationality, Environmental Education 1970, at 18-19
(1970).
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but no! to measures that would seek an idealized static environment
at the cost of economic growth and technological "progress."
The second possibility, held by the more optimistic environmentalists, is that people can, and will, change when they understand
the situation. From this viewpoint, education and new laws may be
relied upon to change social priorities and behavior. But this view
assumes that people will be moved by information to take right
action. Unfortunately, experience offers little support for this assumption. Knowing and believing are two quite different states of
mind. "Deductions," as Cardinal Newman observed, "have no power
of persuasion.... Many a man will live and die upon a dogma: no
man will be a martyr for a conclusion." 9 To change people through
education may require strategies and methods not available to formal
schooling in pluralistic or democratic society. Knowledge in itself
cannot be relied upon for action. Linked to a purpose toward which
a coherent plan of action is programmed, knowledge may have a
powerful reinforcing effect. Thus, the expectation of voluntary social
acceptance of environmental quality goals implies the rise of an
action-oriented ideology, a system of belief in which knowledge is
joined to moral conviction. Until an imperative toward environmental quality motivates society sufficiently to force action, John
Platt's questions are unlikely to receive adequate answers.
A third possible course combines elements of the two preceding
propositions: first, that the society will not pay the price of environmental quality and, second, that knowledge, although an essential
element of environmental action, will not in itself induce action. The
third possibility is that public opinion will fail to arrest man's headlong rush toward ecological disaster and that, in consequence, a
demoralized and distraught society will belatedly accept environmental policies that would be rejected under less compelling circumstances. This eventuality would imply the emergence of a coherent,
action-oriented ideology for man-environment relationships and a
leadership group, an elite, ready and willing to do whatever may be
required to put society on course toward ecological solvency.
How this outcome would relate to the values and practices of
liberal, representative democracy, as it has been understood in North
America and Northwestern Europe, is also conjectural. To the extent
that consensus existed regarding the quality of life and environment,
the course of societal restructuring would be eased. But let there be
no mistake, the events and conditions attending ecological catastrophe may not be conducive to sweet reasonableness or regard for
all interests and values affected. Studies of ecological disasters under9. John Henry Newman, Discussions and Arguments on Various Subjects 295 (1897).
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taken at the Hudson Institute encourage the belief that man may
survive circumstances of severe environmental stress, but they would
not support the confidence that survival could occur under businessas-usual arrangements.' 0 Man-made eco-catastrophes may be far
more widespread and severe than any natural events that have yet
occurred in history, and their impact could be especially severe if it
fell upon densely populated, highly interdependent megalopoli. A
considerable displacement of traditional human rights by new rights
and obligations would probably occur. Several major sectors of the
economy would disappear or be thoroughly transformed.
Most Americans, and perhaps most people everywhere, would
probably prefer that such transformation be orderly, gradual, and
predictable. But this preference does not reflect the way in which
societies normally change directions or alter course. Duress has been
the most reliable mover of men. If some major restructuring is required for the solution of environmental problems, the previous
structure must be reoriented or reorganized so that it does not obstruct or retard the development of the displacing system. In a
democratic society, this task can most easily be performed if and
when the established system is threatened with collapse from internal
stress. The constructive reorientation of society along ecologically
rational lines would not be easily accomplished at any time, but
conditions of extreme social disorder would be especially unfavorable. But it may be that the established way of managing the
economy would have to be weakened to a point at which the
''public" and its political representatives be prepared to revise
priorities and to consider alternative ways of managing the nation's
economic and political affairs. Realization of the need for fundamental institutional and behavioral changes probably will require
more than intellectual conviction. For the mass of men, experience
may be the only convincing teacher. Even for the best informed, an
emotional impetus is needed to reinforce the knowledge that man's
behavior in relation to his environment must change. As James V.
Neel has well said: "To some of us, this realization carries with it the
need for a philosophical readjustment which has the impact of a
religious conversion.'' 1
Fortunately, representative democracy contains the potentiality of
self-correction. Socio-ecological collapse does not seem to be an inexorable end for the hypertrophic society-at least its probability
10. J. Ingersoll, Historical Examples of Ecological Disaster, Part 1, HI-242-RR/A 2-3
(1963) and Part II, HI-303-RR/A 1-2 (1964) (on file at Hudson Institute, N.Y.). See also R.
Ayres, Special Aspects of Environment Resulting from Various Kinds of Nuclear Wars, Part
1Il, HI-388-RR, ch. 4 (Nov. 30, 1964) (on file at Hudson Institute, N.Y.).
11. Lessons from a PrimitivePeople, Science 819 (1970).
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cannot be proved, and the art of political leadership in our time
should be directed to insure, as best we may, that does not occur. All
social and political systems change, and the constructive task of
politics is to speed the transformation of the present system into a
more stable and self-renewing society. The task is to cure the patient
of the "disease" of societal hypertrophy, not to eliminate the
symptoms by killing the patient. And, if in spite of our best efforts,
we are unable to avoid disaster, some moral satisfaction may be
gained by the knowledge that our failure was not a failure of nerve or
will. If man is inherently unequal to the task, the outcome may be
tragic; but it will be neither disgraceful nor absurd. To blunder into
ecological disaster through the hypertrophic tendencies now in
momentum, would be both.

